Schmidt was in New York presenting his annual report to the United Nations Security Council when the news broke, with his office describing it as a "private decision" after nearly five years in the role.
The resignation comes amid competing international pressures and commercial entanglements involving the Trump family. Balkan Insight reported that Donald Trump Jr. visited the Republika Srpska entity in early April, meeting business leaders to discuss investment opportunities — part of broader Trump Organization engagement in the region that includes a $1.5 billion gas pipeline project approved by Bosnia in mid-April. That infrastructure deal, led by AAFS Infrastructure and Energy — a firm run by Trump-linked figures including Jesse Binnall and Joseph Flynn — has raised transparency concerns, with critics warning it bypasses competitive tender processes and could create conflicts of interest.
Schmidt's departure will test already frayed relations between US and EU decision makers and reopen questions about the role of Russia in the Balkans, according to analysis published by Balkan Insight. Russia and China have long disputed Schmidt's legitimacy, as he was appointed without a corresponding United Nations Security Council resolution. Milorad Dodik, the Bosnian Serb leader who attended Moscow's Victory Day Parade days before Schmidt's resignation, has consistently challenged the High Representative's authority and repeatedly threatened to withdraw Republika Srpska from key state institutions.
The Office of the High Representative was established under the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement to oversee implementation of the accord that ended a war killing over 100,000 people. Schmidt will continue to perform all regular duties until the appointment process for his successor is completed, but his resignation will reopen local and international debates about closing the battered office or further weakening its powers, a decision that will determine Bosnia's future stability or potential destabilization. The convergence of Schmidt's ouster with Trump-linked business interests and Russian influence campaigns in the region amplifies concerns about governance deterioration in one of Europe's most volatile post-conflict zones at a moment when international coordination appears increasingly strained.
The Trump administration is considering an executive order that would mandate government review of advanced AI models before public release, according to Tom's Hardware and The Hill. The proposal would establish a working group of technology executives and government officials to develop oversight procedures, with the NSA, the White House Office of the National Cyber Director, and the Director of National Intelligence potentially overseeing model reviews.
The discussions represent a sharp reversal for an administration that revoked Biden's AI safety executive order within hours of taking office in January 2025. Kevin Hassett, director of the National Economic Council, told Federal News Network on 7 May that the White House is "studying possibly an executive order" to ensure future AI models "go through a process so that they're released in the wild after they've been proven safe, just like an FDA drug." A White House official subsequently characterised discussion of a potential executive order as "speculation," though the administration confirmed it is balancing innovation with security in AI policymaking.
The shift appears driven by concerns over Anthropic's Mythos model, which the company says can identify thousands of critical software vulnerabilities and has declined to release publicly. The Washington Post reported that the arrival of Mythos "has begun to crack the White House's hard-line stance" on promoting AI technology. The model's capabilities have prompted the administration to brief leaders from Anthropic, Google, and OpenAI on the review plans, according to officials cited by the New York Times. The proposed approach resembles the UK's AI Security Institute, which evaluates frontier models against safety benchmarks before deployment, though Tom's Hardware notes the US currently has no legal authority to require such reviews.
In parallel with the executive order discussions, the Commerce Department's Center for AI Standards and Innovation announced on 6 May that Google DeepMind, Microsoft, and xAI have agreed to voluntary pre-deployment evaluations of their models, joining existing agreements with OpenAI and Anthropic. Federal News Network reported that CAISI has conducted 40 evaluations to date, including on unreleased models. The timing has sparked debate within the AI policy community: a day after the White House proposal was reported, former Trump AI adviser Dean Ball and former Biden AI adviser Ben Buchanan co-authored a New York Times op-ed calling for Congress to mandate third-party audits of AI developers' safety claims. Some critics, including analysts at the Cato Institute, have warned that pre-approval systems could function as a "kill switch" on innovation and were considered heavy-handed even under the Biden administration.
Sentinel forecasters estimate a 32 per cent probability that the US Federal Government will regulate the release of all new AI models from frontier laboratories through executive order or legislation by 3 November 2026. Such a regime would represent a significant departure from the current voluntary framework and introduce pre-deployment review mechanisms analogous to those used in pharmaceuticals and other high-stakes sectors. Legal experts writing in Lawfare note that the president's authority to mandate such vetting without legislation remains uncertain, with the Defense Production Act an unlikely basis and alternative statutes requiring stretched interpretations that courts may not accept.
A French woman who contracted the virus on the vessel has developed a severe form of the disease causing life-threatening lung and heart problems and is being treated with an artificial lung in intensive care at Bichat Hospital in Paris, according to the Associated Press.
The outbreak has been linked to the Andes virus, which caused infections after the ship departed Ushuaia, Argentina on 1 April 2026. As of 4 May, seven cases—two laboratory confirmed and five suspected—had been identified, including three deaths, one critically ill patient and three individuals with mild symptoms, according to a WHO Disease Outbreak News report. The outbreak has now reached 11 total reported cases, nine of which have been confirmed.
The WHO chief thanked Spain for accepting the stricken cruise ship, which arrived in Tenerife on 10 May before passengers disembarked and evacuation flights repatriated them to six European countries and Canada. The Andes virus is the only known hantavirus to spread between humans, typically through cases of close sustained contact, though it may be airborne. Although uncommon, limited human-to-human transmission has been reported in previous outbreaks of Andes virus, the WHO noted.
The outbreak represents an unusual transmission pattern for hantavirus, which typically spreads through contact with rodent droppings or urine rather than human-to-human contact. WHO is working on the assumption that the Dutch couple who died were infected off the ship, possibly while sightseeing in Argentina before joining the cruise, CNN reported. Argentine officials have said the couple took a bird-watching tour that included a stop at a garbage dump where they may have been exposed to rodents carrying the infection.
The WHO's emphasis on international preparation and the extended quarantine period suggest concern about potential human transmission beyond the cruise ship environment. While Tedros said there is no sign of a larger outbreak beginning, he noted the situation could change and that given the long incubation period of the virus, more cases might emerge in the coming weeks. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has classified the outbreak as a "level 3" emergency response, according to reports.
The approved budget represents a dramatic reduction from the NT$1.25 trillion (approximately US$40 billion) comprehensive defence package sought by the Lai administration, dealing a severe blow to Taiwan's "porcupine strategy" at a moment of heightened geopolitical vulnerability.
The cuts come at a strategically perilous juncture. The U.S. Department of State warned that any "further delays in funding the remaining proposed capabilities" would represent a "concession" to China. The porcupine strategy, which calls for an emphasis on fighting an asymmetric war against superior Chinese forces, in contrast with Taiwan's historical tendency to invest in large weapons platforms, has been championed by defence analysts as essential to maintaining deterrence. The approach relies on making occupation prohibitively costly to China by engaging in an extended resistance until an expected intervention by the United States or other third party nations.
The budget approved by the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People's Party (TPP) prioritizes select U.S. arms procurement while deliberately excluding critical domestic defense initiatives, including the "T-Dome" air defense system's Chiang Kung anti-ballistic missile, which is meant to form the backbone of Taiwan's new integrated air defense. According to Taipei Times, the original NT$1.25 trillion budget included three main parts: the "Taiwan Shield" for air defense, high-tech systems to build precision strike capability and support for Taiwan's domestic defense industry. The decision appears driven by domestic political dysfunction rather than strategic calculation, with opposition parties reducing the proposed funding by nearly 40%.
The timing could scarcely be worse for Taiwan's deterrence posture. The legislative move signals internal division precisely when China is assessing the island's vulnerability and US resolve remains uncertain under the Trump administration. The Strategist quoted Lo Chih-cheng, a senior research fellow with Taiwan's Institute for National Policy Research, saying the cuts weaken Taiwan's defence capabilities at a moment when "the military balance is rapidly tilting in favour of the PRC". Breaking Defense reported that de facto US ambassador to Taiwan, Raymond Greene, said in April that it was vital that the supplementary budget was approved, underscoring American concerns about the delay.
The budget cuts may embolden Beijing to test Taiwan's resolve during a period when great-power competition over Taiwan represents one of the most plausible pathways to major conflict between nuclear-armed states. The significant budget cuts could undermine mutual trust between Taiwan and the U.S., as well as Taiwan's commitment to maintaining its self-defense capability and regional peace, warned the ruling Democratic Progressive Party. The legislative dysfunction comes as Taiwan's ability to field the dispersed, mobile defensive systems central to the porcupine concept remains far from realised, with defence experts noting a persistent gap between Taiwan's stated asymmetric strategy and its actual investment priorities.
The rapid escalation reflects both investor enthusiasm and strategic state backing as China seeks to establish technological self-reliance in artificial intelligence.
According to South China Morning Post, the company is expected to close its first external financing round shortly, with state-backed investors including affiliates of China's National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund—known as "Big Fund III"—playing a central role. TechCrunch and Dataconomy report the round could raise between $3 billion and $7.35 billion, which would mark the largest single funding round for a Chinese AI company. Tencent and Alibaba are also in discussions to participate, with Tencent reportedly proposing a stake of up to 20 percent, though founder Liang Wenfeng—who controls nearly 90 percent of the company—has been hesitant to cede significant ownership.
The shift to external financing represents a strategic pivot for DeepSeek, which had previously rejected venture capital offers and operated entirely on funding from High-Flyer, Liang's quantitative hedge fund. Sources cited by the Financial Times indicate that intensifying competition and talent poaching by rivals prompted the decision to raise funds, enabling the company to offer equity to employees and expand computing infrastructure. The lab has faced attrition of key researchers, and the capital is intended to support both retention and the procurement of domestic hardware, particularly Huawei's Ascend chips, as DeepSeek optimizes its models to run on Chinese semiconductors rather than U.S. technology.
DeepSeek released its V4 series models on 24 April 2026, featuring a 1.6-trillion parameter architecture and million-token context windows, according to Wikipedia. While the company has maintained technical competitiveness through cost-efficient training methods and open-weight releases, independent assessments suggest its latest models still trail leading U.S. and Chinese systems in certain advanced capabilities. The valuation climb—particularly the acceleration from $10 billion to over $50 billion in under three weeks—signals not only investor confidence but also state prioritization: 36Kr notes that the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund's involvement elevates large language models to a strategic status comparable to chip manufacturing. This reconfiguration of capital flows and state backing could enable DeepSeek to sustain competitiveness at scale, positioning it as a credible alternative development path in global AI and potentially accelerating capability diffusion through its continued commitment to open-source releases.
The attacks marked the first time data centres have been deliberately targeted for air strikes in a conflict, establishing commercial cloud infrastructure as a legitimate military target and fundamentally reshaping the security calculus for planned AI facilities in politically volatile regions.
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed the strikes were against data centres supporting "the enemy's" military and intelligence activities. The justification reflects growing awareness that the U.S. military used Anthropic's AI model Claude—which runs on AWS—for intelligence assessments, target identification, and battle simulations during the Iran strikes. The boundary between commercial cloud computing and military operations has largely vanished, as the Pentagon's Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability runs on the same commercial infrastructure serving civilian customers, according to Fortune.
The physical damage was substantial. The strikes took out two of three availability zones in the UAE region (ME-CENTRAL-1), while AWS confirmed structural damage, power disruption, fire, and water damage from suppression systems. Outages were reported by Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, Emirates NBD, First Abu Dhabi Bank, payments platforms Hubpay and Alaan, data cloud company Snowflake, and the massive ride-hailing platform Careem. Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan noted the attack as "a very savvy move" that puts data centres into the same targeting category as oil refineries and power grids.
The strikes carry profound implications for AI infrastructure development in the Middle East. The Stargate project—a joint venture planning to invest up to $500 billion in AI infrastructure by 2029—has already established a 1GW cluster in Abu Dhabi expected to go live in 2026. Sam Winter-Levy, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, told Rest of World that physical attacks are "only going to become more common moving forward as AI becomes more and more significant". Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps released a video threatening the "complete and utter annihilation" of the under-construction Stargate facility if the US attacks Iranian power infrastructure, marking an unprecedented escalation where AI infrastructure becomes a proxy in international tensions.
Security analysts worry this precedent will be adopted by other adversaries, forcing Western militaries and technology companies to account for a much wider array of vulnerable infrastructure in future conflicts. Zachary Kallenborn, a researcher at King's College London, told Fortune that "if data centres become critical hubs for transiting military information, we can expect them to be increasingly targeted by both cyber and physical attacks". The timing is particularly problematic given the concentration of planned AI training facilities in politically volatile regions, with data localisation mandates requiring cloud providers to build physical facilities in markets that may lack geopolitical stability.
The Trump administration moved toward a mandatory pre-approval regime for advanced AI systems on 7 May, with National Economic Council Director Kevin Hassett telling The Hill that the White House is studying an executive order requiring frontier models to undergo safety review before release. The proposal marks a sharp reversal of the administration's previous deregulatory stance and has triggered bipartisan alarm over its constitutional implications and competitive consequences.
The policy shift follows a tense White House confrontation with Anthropic over its Mythos model, which the company released in limited form on 7 April to a small group of organisations including Amazon, Microsoft, Google, and major financial institutions. Mythos demonstrated the ability to identify decades-old security vulnerabilities at scale, prompting Vice President JD Vance to convene an emergency call with AI chief executives in April, warning that such capabilities could enable cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. The administration subsequently blocked Anthropic's plan to expand Mythos access to approximately 70 additional organisations, with National Cyber Director Sean Cairncross leading the government's response. The intervention came despite—or perhaps because of—the model's defensive potential: Mythos is designed to help organisations patch vulnerabilities before adversaries exploit them, yet unauthorised users gained access through private channels shortly after the limited release.
The proposed FDA-style licensing system has drawn fierce criticism from unexpected quarters. Policy analysts at the American Enterprise Institute note that the FDA analogy is fundamentally flawed: unlike pharmaceuticals, AI systems are dynamic, their risks uncertain and difficult to measure, and their behaviour shifts between testing and deployment. Critics warn the regime could function as a "kill switch" for innovation and expression, with the government potentially lacking legal authority for such prior restraint absent clear statutory authorisation. White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles issued a statement on 6 May emphasising that the administration "is not in the business of picking winners and losers," though sources told The Daily Signal that multiple draft executive orders remain under active debate, with significant internal disagreement over the strength of proposed vetting processes.
The controversy unfolds as Washington and Beijing weigh official AI discussions ahead of an upcoming US-China summit. According to Bloomberg, conversations are exploring restrictions on model access—a potentially more tractable coordination mechanism than development limits. Meanwhile, the administration continues to grapple with the fraught fallout from the forced departure of former AI czar David Sacks, whose light-touch regulatory philosophy dominated policy until Mythos upended the White House's approach. The resulting policy disarray has left the US without a coherent framework for evaluating frontier capabilities as they emerge, forcing reactive responses to each new model release—precisely the dynamic safety researchers have long warned against.
On 9 May 2026, Russian President Vladimir Putin told reporters he believes the Ukraine war is "coming to an end" and expressed willingness to negotiate new European security arrangements, according to CNBC. The remarks followed Moscow's most scaled-back Victory Day parade in years, where instead of intercontinental ballistic missiles and tanks rolling across Red Square, Russia displayed videos of military hardware on giant screens.
Putin indicated his preferred negotiating partner would be former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. When asked about engaging in talks with Europeans, Putin said his preferred figure was Schröder, telling reporters: "For me personally, the former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Schröder, is preferable," CNBC reported. The choice of Schröder — known for his close ties to Russia and controversial post-chancellorship roles with Russian energy companies — suggests Putin's terms would likely favour Russian strategic interests.
The statement came amid a three-day ceasefire brokered by US President Donald Trump, during which Russia and Ukraine agreed to exchange 1,000 prisoners, developments that raised cautious hopes of renewed diplomatic progress. Speaking at the Kremlin, Putin blamed Western leaders for the conflict, saying they promised NATO would not expand eastward after the fall of the Berlin Wall but then tried to draw Ukraine into the EU's orbit. Russian troops have been fighting in Ukraine for well over four years — longer than Soviet forces fought in the Second World War.
Putin, who has ruled Russia since the last day of 1999, faces mounting anxiety in Moscow about a war that has killed hundreds of thousands, left swathes of Ukraine in ruins, and drained Russia's $3 trillion economy, the Detroit News reported. Russian forces control just under one fifth of Ukrainian territory and have so far been unable to take the whole of the Donbas region, where Kyiv's forces have been pushed back to a line of fortress cities. Whether Putin's comments signal genuine willingness to conclude the conflict or represent a negotiating tactic remains uncertain, but the statement marks a significant rhetorical shift for a leader who has repeatedly vowed to fight on until all of Russia's various war aims are achieved.
The war, Europe's deadliest conflict since 1945, has profoundly destabilised the international order. Russia's 2022 invasion triggered what has been described as the most serious crisis in relations between Russia and the West since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Asked about meeting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Putin said a meeting was possible only once a lasting peace deal was agreed.
The Iranian position, described by officials as "realistic and positive," emphasises ending hostilities and reopening the Strait of Hormuz before substantive nuclear negotiations, according to Al Jazeera.
The diplomatic manoeuvring follows a two-month conflict that began on 28 February, when US and Israeli forces struck Iranian nuclear facilities. According to Axios, the framework under negotiation would commit Iran to enhanced IAEA inspections and a moratorium on underground enrichment facilities, with the duration of any enrichment freeze actively contested—Iran has proposed five years while the US seeks 20. The sticking point remains Iran's 440-kilogram stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity, close to the 90 percent threshold required for weapons-grade material. While some sources told Axios that Iran may agree to remove highly enriched uranium from the country—a reversal of its previous position—Iranian officials have publicly maintained that the nuclear programme is "non-negotiable" at this stage.
The broader context deepens the stakes. Iran's nuclear infrastructure has been significantly degraded by airstrikes, with Natanz 75 percent damaged and the deeply buried Fordow facility—Iran's main site for 60 percent enrichment—only 30 percent compromised. Yet the International Atomic Energy Agency has been unable to verify the status or location of Iran's uranium stockpile since the conflict began, creating what the IAEA describes as the most significant verification blackout in its history with Iran. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi has warned that the 440-kilogram stockpile, if further enriched, could yield enough fissile material for up to ten nuclear weapons.
Whether Iran's latest signals represent tactical positioning or genuine flexibility remains uncertain. The proposed memorandum of understanding would initiate a 30-day negotiation period to resolve the Strait of Hormuz blockade, lift sanctions, and establish nuclear limits. If those talks collapse, the US has indicated it could restore its naval blockade or resume military action. Tehran's insistence on phased negotiations—ending the war first, addressing the nuclear programme later—reflects long-standing concerns that any interim agreement could leave Iran vulnerable to renewed attack, a fear reinforced by the February strikes that occurred while indirect talks were underway. For observers tracking nuclear risk, the proposal offers a fragile diplomatic corridor, but one shadowed by verification gaps, infrastructure damage, and the enduring question of whether either side can deliver binding commitments that survive political pressure at home.
Go deeper: Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation analysis on Iran's 60% enriched uranium stockpile
Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan interpreted this language as suggesting potential nuclear weapon use, describing it as "not a path we should be walking very far down." The remark represents one of the most explicit nuclear threats in decades of US-Iran confrontation, made against a backdrop of deteriorating military conditions in the strait and growing domestic pressure on the administration.
The comment came as approximately 20,000 American sailors remained exposed aboard vessels in the Persian Gulf's narrow shipping channels, unable to provide two-way traffic through areas cleared of mines. According to CBS News, two US destroyers transited the Strait of Hormuz on 4 May after navigating a sustained Iranian barrage of missiles, drones, and small boats, though defensive measures successfully intercepted incoming threats. The operation, dubbed "Project Freedom," was subsequently suspended on 6 May to allow more time for peace negotiations—a decision that underscored the administration's recognition that sustained operations in the strait remain untenable.
Military analysts note the US is "one inch away from catastrophe" if Iran successfully hits a ship—an eventuality deemed inevitable if forces remain in contact with Iranian capabilities long enough. The administration has backed itself into a position where it has built public expectations of risk-free operations without articulating a strategic rationale that would justify higher casualties. The Washington Post reported that President Trump threatened on 6 May that US bombing would resume "at a much higher level" if Iran did not agree to his latest peace plan. This leaves commanders without clear guidance on acceptable risk to mission or risk to force, while the threat of nuclear escalation now hangs over tactical decisions in one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints.
The situation reflects a broader strategic impasse following the February 2026 US-Israeli strikes that killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and triggered Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz. A fragile ceasefire has held since 7 April, with Pakistan mediating negotiations, but talks have repeatedly stalled over demands for zero uranium enrichment and control of the strait. With hundreds of ships and as many as 20,000 seafarers trapped in the region and global oil prices soaring, the intersection of tactical vulnerability and nuclear rhetoric marks a dangerous escalation in the crisis.
The declaration came as the conflict reached the 60-day threshold established by the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which mandates that the president terminate hostilities or seek congressional authorisation after that period.
Speaking to reporters on 2 May as he departed the White House, Trump dismissed the War Powers Act as unconstitutional, stating that "it's never been sought before" and that previous administrations considered it in violation of Article II. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reinforced this position, telling reporters the administration viewed the law as "100 percent" unconstitutional, though officials would continue to comply with notification requirements to preserve congressional relations. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth had earlier argued before the Senate Armed Services Committee that the administration's interpretation allowed the 60-day clock to "pause or stop" during the ceasefire period, a legal theory contested by Senator Tim Kaine, who warned the statute would not support that reading.
The defiance sets a stark precedent. While previous presidents including Bill Clinton and Barack Obama found ways to continue operations beyond the 60-day mark — Clinton in Kosovo, Obama in Libya — constitutional experts note that none of those conflicts approached the scale and intensity of the current Iran war, which has cost $25 billion and resulted in at least 3,300 Iranian deaths. Senate Democrats forced six successive votes to invoke the War Powers Resolution, all of which failed, though Maine Republican Senator Susan Collins broke ranks for the first time to vote with Democrats, warning that the 60-day deadline "is not a suggestion; it is a requirement."
Congressional forecasters assign only a 6% probability that lawmakers will use the War Powers Act to constrain the conflict before June 2026, reflecting expectations of party discipline among Republicans who control narrow majorities in both chambers. Several Republican senators — including John Curtis of Utah, Thom Tillis of North Carolina, and Lisa Murkowski of Alaska — have publicly stated they expect eventual congressional authorisation, with Murkowski threatening to introduce her own authorisation for use of military force if the administration does not present a credible plan. Yet Senate leadership has not brought any such measure to the floor, and House Speaker Mike Johnson told NBC News that Congress need not act because the United States is "not at war," despite Trump himself repeatedly referring to the conflict as a war in public remarks.
The constitutional implications extend beyond the immediate conflict. The War Powers Resolution was enacted in 1973 over President Nixon's veto specifically to prevent unchecked executive war-making after Vietnam. Courts have historically avoided ruling on its constitutionality, and Congress has never successfully used it to end a military campaign. Trump's open defiance — combined with congressional acquiescence — effectively nullifies a statutory constraint that has stood for five decades, establishing that a president can sustain large-scale combat operations indefinitely without legislative approval if Congress lacks the political will to intervene.
Generated at 2026-05-13 05:43 UTC