The ban, codified under 10 U.S.C. §4872, would prohibit defence contractors from using rare earth magnets if any stage of production—from mining through fabrication—occurred in China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea.
Permanent magnets are critical components across the defence industrial base. An F-35 carries 435 kilograms of rare earths, while next-generation destroyers require 4.5 tonnes and nuclear submarines 1.5 tonnes. The magnets are also essential for drones, guided munitions, precision navigation systems, and radar platforms—as well as civilian applications including wind turbines, which require approximately 12,000 kilograms per offshore unit, and electric vehicles. The deadline was already extended by one year in the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act to give industry more time to qualify alternative suppliers, but major contractors including Lockheed Martin and Boeing are now mapping supply chains and warning that compliance may not be feasible without significantly more domestic capacity.
The supply constraint has been exacerbated by China's own export restrictions. In April 2025, Beijing imposed licensing requirements on seven rare earth elements and magnets, causing weeks-long delays for defence manufacturers. China later expanded controls in October 2025 to include a foreign direct product rule requiring export licenses for magnets containing even trace amounts—as little as 0.1 percent—of Chinese-origin materials. The licensing regime has been used to automatically deny exports intended for defence applications, creating immediate constraints on US and European rearmament efforts. China controls 94 percent of global permanent magnet manufacturing and roughly 90 percent of rare earth refining, giving Beijing substantial leverage over Western defence supply chains.
Despite the Pentagon investing hundreds of millions of dollars since 2020 under the Defense Production Act to rebuild domestic mining, refining, and magnet-making capacity, no fully scaled American mine-to-magnet chain exists. MP Materials' Texas plant aims to produce 10,000 tonnes of magnets annually by decade's end—barely half of projected US demand by 2030. The United States currently has one major rare earth mine at Mountain Pass, California, but most output still travels to China for processing. Industry analysts warn that converting rare earth oxide into defence-grade metal and alloys—a step that occurs almost entirely in China—requires three to seven years to replicate from initial investment to reliable production. A Govini analysis found more than 80,000 defence parts depend on minerals now subject to Chinese export controls, and smaller suppliers warn they maintain at best a few months of stockpiles. The CEO of Rheinmetall has stated his company maintains only one year of rare earth stock and requires weekly updates on supply levels, underscoring the fragility of European defence supply chains facing similar pressures.
The October 2025 Trump-Xi meeting in South Korea produced an official US readout revealing that Washington is actively seeking Chinese help to access rare earth refining technologies that China banned from export in 2008—long before Western lithography controls on China. The readout stated that "the Chinese side will address the concerns of the US side of not shipping out key rare earth production technologies," marking an extraordinary admission of technological dependence at the head-of-state level.
This public acknowledgment underscores the depth of Western vulnerability in critical minerals processing. As of April 2025, there was zero commercial-scale heavy rare earth refining capacity operating in the United States, representing 100% global dependency on China for these materials. Beijing commands the separation of heavy rare earths, none of which currently occurs in the United States, while China separates 99.9 percent of heavy rare earths globally. These elements are essential for advanced military systems including F-35 fighter jets, laser and radar systems, and precision-guided munitions.
China banned the export of rare earth extraction and separation technologies in December 2023, tightening controls that originated with export duties imposed in 2007-2008. The technology restrictions came as part of Beijing's broader strategy to maintain dominance not only over raw materials but over the specialized expertise required to process them. China possesses technical know-how in solvent extraction processing for rare earths that Western companies have struggled to replicate, both due to the complexity of advanced operations and environmental concerns associated with the refining process.
Industry signals about Western capabilities remain contradictory. Malaysia became the first country outside China to produce dysprosium oxide in 2025, a key heavy rare earth for defense applications, suggesting some progress in building alternative supply chains. Lynas has reportedly advanced its heavy rare earth refining operations in Malaysia, and Solvay's CEO claimed in a Dutch newspaper interview that the company can refine all 17 rare earths but won't invest without protection from Chinese market flooding. However, the Trump administration's explicit request for Chinese technology transfer at the May 2026 summit—following the initial October 2025 meeting—suggests official assessments remain pessimistic about the actual state of Western refining capabilities, particularly at commercial scale.
The technology gap carries profound implications for both economic and national security. The International Energy Agency estimated in April 2026 that if China's suspended rare earth export restrictions were fully implemented, countries outside China could face an annual economic impact of $6.5 trillion, with the automotive sector alone facing potential direct losses exceeding $3 trillion. The United States continues to rely on China for the majority of its rare earth supply, with China accounting for 61% of global mined supply and 91% of global refining capacity as of 2024.
On 15 December 2025, the United States government announced a $7.4 billion partnership with South Korea's Korea Zinc to build an advanced smelter and critical minerals processing facility in Clarksville, Tennessee. The project, backed by $210 million in CHIPS Act funding and structured through a joint venture in which the Department of Defense holds a 40% stake, represents the first primary zinc smelter built in the United States since the 1970s and aims to address complete import dependency on China for gallium and other strategic minerals essential to semiconductors, guided munitions, and AI systems.
The facility, expected to become operational in 2029, will produce 13 critical and strategic minerals including gallium, germanium, antimony, and rare earths, processing approximately 1.1 million tons of raw materials annually. Yet the investment highlights a persistent structural challenge in critical mineral reshoring: even substantial upstream capacity does not create end-to-end domestic supply chains. Gallium smelted in Tennessee must still be shipped to Europe, Japan, or China to be transformed into gallium arsenide wafers—a midstream processing step in which those regions hold specialized capacity—before returning to the United States and Taiwan for final chip fabrication. This fragmentation across allied and non-allied nations leaves multiple points of vulnerability, particularly as China targets midstream bottlenecks in response to Western technology export controls.
China's countermeasures have focused precisely on these weak links. In January and February 2026, Chinese exports of gallium to Japan—which had received 58% of China's gallium exports in 2025—dropped to zero, following new state-controlled licensing requirements for dual-use minerals announced in early January. While China briefly resumed limited gallium shipments to Japan in May 2026 after a four-month suspension, germanium exports remain halted. The restrictions compound pressure on Japanese gallium arsenide wafer production capacity, creating risk that this critical processing step migrates to China or disappears entirely, further deepening Western reliance on Chinese supply chains. Gallium prices surged more than 150% following China's initial export controls in 2023, with the Rotterdam price reaching $687 per kilogram in May 2025, underscoring the economic leverage Beijing wields through its dominance of approximately 99% of global gallium production.
Analysts argue the fragmentation problem cannot be solved unilaterally. Allied coordination is essential to distribute mining, refining, and processing capacity across trusted partners, yet national security considerations and industrial policy incentives make efficiency-based allocation politically difficult. Each country seeks to maximize domestic value capture and strategic autonomy, even when this results in duplicative or suboptimal investment. The Tennessee smelter exemplifies this tension: it addresses one chokepoint—raw gallium production—while leaving midstream wafer fabrication and final assembly distributed across jurisdictions with divergent interests. The Oregon Group notes that the project signals Washington's willingness to deploy capital and allied partnerships to rebuild industrial capacity, but warns that without coordinated allied investment in midstream processing, vulnerabilities will persist and China retains powerful leverage to disrupt high-tech supply chains critical to defense and artificial intelligence systems.
On 11 June, Senator Mark Warner, vice chair of the US Senate Intelligence Committee, disclosed that General Joshua Rudd—who simultaneously leads the National Security Agency and US Cyber Command—told him Anthropic's Mythos model had penetrated nearly all of the NSA's classified systems during an authorized red-team exercise. Warner quoted Rudd as saying the model "broke into almost all of our classified systems, not in weeks, but in hours." The claim, first reported by The Economist, surfaced in the context of Warner making the case for mandatory security testing of frontier AI models, and he framed the incident as evidence that responsible laboratories must be required to assess offensive capabilities before release.
The statement remains unconfirmed by any government agency, and Shashank Joshi, the Economist editor who published the original account, later clarified the claim "should not be read literally," noting it depended on Mythos working alongside other tools under specific conditions. Security and crypto executives have challenged the viral narrative, with BitGo CEO Mike Belshe calling it false and critics noting the absence of independent confirmation. The breach occurred during a controlled security evaluation on the agency's own networks, not an adversarial intrusion, and the full classified details have not been made public.
One day after Warner's disclosure, the US Commerce Department issued an export-control directive barring all foreign nationals—including Anthropic's own non-citizen employees—from accessing Fable 5 and Mythos 5. Unable to enforce nationality-based restrictions without blocking its own staff, Anthropic suspended both models globally. This marked the first time the United States had applied export controls directly to an AI model rather than to chips or hardware, a landmark regulatory precedent. Allied governments within the Five Eyes intelligence alliance were caught off guard, with permissions for agencies, banks, and major firms revoked without warning.
The intelligence agencies of all five Five Eyes nations issued a rare joint statement on 19 June warning that frontier AI models are "anticipated to exceed current industry expectations, fundamentally transforming both offensive and defensive cyber capabilities," adding that "the timeline is not years, it is months." Despite the government action, roughly six Anthropic engineers remain embedded inside the NSA as forward-deployed staff under Project Glasswing, adapting Mythos for operational use including potential infiltration of networks operated by China and Iran. The models remain offline for most users, though negotiations between Anthropic and the White House are ongoing.
ASML has categorically denied the allegation, stating that all 314 of its operational EUV systems worldwide are accounted for and none are located in China.
The dispute carries profound implications for the global AI supply chain. ASML is the only company on the planet that manufactures EUV lithography machines, which are used by firms such as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. to manufacture processors for the likes of Nvidia Corp. Senior Trump administration officials claim to hold evidence of EUV-related components and transport equipment being shipped to China, though that evidence has not been shared publicly or with ASML itself. According to Bloomberg, which first reported the confrontation on 19 June, the 180-ton EUV systems require constant ASML maintenance to operate.
Following Lutnick's allegations, ASML circulated a document in Washington titled "No indication of any ASML EUV System in China," counting 314 EUV machines in operation worldwide and 26 that have been decommissioned, none of them in China. The company has stated it tracks every machine through remote telemetry and that its China-based staff are walled off from EUV technology, documentation, and training. The confrontation has placed ASML in what Bloomberg characterised as internal "crisis mode", with the company required to prove the absence of equipment rather than confirm its presence.
The allegations emerge against a backdrop of intensifying US efforts to restrict China's access to advanced chipmaking tools. Export curbs introduced under the first Trump administration barred EUV exports to China, and the Netherlands has prohibited such exports since 2019. A bipartisan congressional bill advancing through committee would extend restrictions to cover all of ASML's deep ultraviolet lithography tools — older, less advanced systems that currently account for approximately 20 per cent of ASML's expected 2026 revenue from permitted sales to China. In December 2025, Reuters reported that Chinese researchers had developed a prototype EUV lithography machine, led by former ASML engineers. If China has successfully acquired or replicated functional EUV technology — whether through illicit transfer, component-level smuggling, or indigenous development — it would represent a fundamental breach of the compute governance architecture designed to constrain Chinese AI capabilities.
The system achieved state-of-the-art results in fixed-budget language model training, small-model training speed, and GPU kernel optimization, according to a company announcement.
The system automates the research loop for a target objective: it proposes an idea, implements it, runs an experiment, validates the result, and uses what it learns to choose the next experiment. It runs many research threads over long horizons, keeps useful context from prior experiments, combines promising branches, and puts results through validation for reward hacks and variance before treating improved performance as real progress. The company has open-sourced training scripts and kernel implementations discovered by the system, publishing them on GitHub.
The benchmarks were chosen for tight feedback loops and clear metrics. NanoChat Autoresearch, based on Andrej Karpathy's repository, tasks systems with training a small language model to the lowest validation loss within a fixed five-minute budget on a single GPU. NanoGPT Speedrun is a harder test: the benchmark asks how quickly a small GPT-style model can be trained to a fixed validation loss of 3.28 on the FineWeb text dataset using a single HGX H100 8-GPU node, and has been optimized by the community for over two years with 83 human record-setting contributions to the leaderboard. Recursive's best run reached the target in 77.3 seconds on 8× H100. SOL-ExecBench tests GPU kernel optimization toward hardware performance limits.
The demonstration arrives weeks after Recursive emerged from stealth in May with $650 million in funding at a $4.65 billion valuation, led by GV and Greycroft, with additional backing from AMD Ventures and NVIDIA. The company was founded in 2025 by researchers from OpenAI, Google DeepMind, Meta AI, Salesforce AI, and Uber AI, including Richard Socher, Tim Rocktäschel, Jeff Clune, Josh Tobin, and Tim Shi. The startup's central thesis is that the next leap in AI will come not from simply building larger models, but from automating the research process itself.
Recursive describes these as early signs that its system can advance the frontier on AI training and infrastructure tasks when the goal is well-defined, measurable, and efficient to evaluate repeatedly. The key uncertainty is whether such results can generalise to domains where goals are less well-defined, harder to measure, and less efficient to evaluate — the characteristics of fundamental AI research breakthroughs. The broader question is whether systems that excel at optimizing narrow, highly instrumented tasks can scale to the open-ended scientific discovery that recursive self-improvement ultimately requires.
The approval represents a dramatic escalation for an operator that has historically underinvested in high-voltage infrastructure, with 345-kV currently the highest operating voltage deployed in the ERCOT system. In December 2025, ERCOT's board approved a $9.4 billion 765 kV Eastern Backbone project, the most expensive single project in the grid operator's history and the first major phase of the broader STEP buildout.
The expansion comes as ERCOT's load forecast for transmission planning grew to more than 150 GW for 2030, driven by surging data center demand and massive renewable investments. According to Enverus Intelligence Research, the $33 billion transmission backbone marks a strategic shift toward system-wide modernization, with the plan expected to eliminate 1,400 miles of upgrades and save millions in congestion costs. ERCOT projects 95.5 GW of solar and 101 GW of battery storage additions by 2030, requiring substantial new transmission capacity to reduce curtailment and unlock stranded renewable resources.
Parallel to the 765 kV buildout, ERCOT is pursuing limited external connections while attempting to preserve its jurisdictional independence. The proposed Southern Spirit Transmission project is an approximately 320-mile ±525 KV, ~3,000 MW high voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission line connecting ERCOT and Southeastern transmission grids. The privately funded project represents a more than $2.6 billion investment by Pattern Energy and would more than double ERCOT's existing external transfer capability. The project received up to $360 million in Department of Energy support and is targeting a 2029 in-service date, though it faces continued legislative and regulatory opposition in Louisiana, where utility company Entergy has raised doubts about the proposal and a bill revised at Entergy's behest could derail the project.
ERCOT has famously remained an island with minimal connections to other grids, deliberately avoiding engaging in interstate commerce to stay outside the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's jurisdiction. The combination of the 765 kV backbone and projects like Southern Spirit represents a meaningful shift in strategy for an operator that has historically prioritized independence over interconnection. As ERCOT's 2024 Regional Transmission Plan notes, global electricity demand is growing exponentially, driven by economic growth, industrial expansion, electrification of transportation, and the rise of data centers and cloud computing—factors that are now forcing even ERCOT to reconsider the limits of grid isolation.
Amperesand announced on 18 November 2025 an $80 million Series A round co-led by Walden Catalyst Ventures and Temasek, while DG Matrix closed a $60 million Series A in February 2026 led by Engine Ventures, bringing its total capital raised to over $100 million.
Solid-state transformers replace traditional iron-and-copper transformers with fast power converters and high-frequency transformers, yielding devices that can be up to 14 times smaller and roughly 40 times lighter than the equipment they replace. More importantly, an SST is an active, controllable device that can regulate voltage in real time, enable bidirectional power flow between AC and DC systems, and provide grid-support functions that passive transformers cannot. Amperesand expects to deliver 30MW of commercial systems in 2026 to hyperscale AI data centre and critical power customers, targeting applications including megawatt EV charging and utility deployments. The company, founded by veterans of ABB, GE, Siemens, and Vestas, has established engineering and advanced manufacturing hubs in San Francisco and Reno.
DG Matrix has partnered with PowerSecure, a Southern Company subsidiary, in a deal announced 9 December to accelerate deployment of next-generation power infrastructure for AI data centres and large-scale electrification projects. The company has also announced a strategic partnership with Exowatt, backed by a16z and Sam Altman, to deploy gigawatt-scale power systems for hyperscale data centres, with Exowatt selecting DG Matrix's Interport platform for its modular generation and storage systems. One of the most promising applications for both companies is converting medium-voltage AC from the grid directly to 800VDC for AI data centres, bypassing conventional transformers entirely and sidestepping the interconnection queues that have become a major bottleneck for new capacity. Lead times for traditional electrical equipment—including transformers, switchgear and uninterruptible power supply systems—have quadrupled since 2019, now averaging 12 to 24 months.
The market for SSTs is expected to more than triple by 2033, driven by surging demand from AI infrastructure. Training clusters for large language models can swing from idle to full power draw within minutes, placing stress on both on-site electrical systems and upstream grid infrastructure, creating demand for power architectures that can absorb these transients while maintaining efficiency. However, SSTs trade iron for silicon and gallium, making them significantly more sensitive to supply chain vulnerabilities in wide-bandgap semiconductors and advanced magnets that China dominates. Amperesand has emphasised that its platform is built on secure, regionalised supply chains, positioning the technology as critical to national security interests as well as commercial AI deployment.
The Senate Armed Services Committee unveiled extensive AI provisions in its version of the fiscal year 2027 National Defense Authorization Act on 10 June, including what amounts to a prohibition on the use of artificial intelligence in nuclear weapon launch decisions and a requirement for human judgment in lethal force determinations. The $1.15 trillion bill represents Congress's most comprehensive attempt to date to regulate military AI use in the highest-stakes domains.
The Senate draft would ban the use of AI to decide whether nuclear weapons should be deployed and forbid the military from planning attacks without the incorporation of appropriate levels of human judgment, according to NOTUS. Senator Elissa Slotkin described the measures as establishing "first ever comprehensive safeguards" governing AI deployment across the Department of Defense, ensuring a human has ultimate decision authority when autonomous weapons are fired and that a human remains on the switch for nuclear launches. The provisions build on earlier legislation, including the Block Nuclear Launch by Autonomous Artificial Intelligence Act passed in 2023, and would codify existing Pentagon Directive 3000.09 into law.
Both Senate and House versions of the NDAA would complicate the Defense Department's ability to designate companies as supply chain risks, potentially constraining future restrictions on AI firms. The nuclear weapons language appears designed to move beyond guidelines to enforceable prohibition: one analysis noted that codifying the restriction in statute gives it the force of law rather than leaving it to executive branch discretion, which can shift with administrations. However, the bill text falls short of detailing what constitutes appropriate human judgment in practice, according to NOTUS, and experts have warned that without accompanying accountability mechanisms, the provisions may preserve the appearance of human control while the substance erodes.
The timing is significant given recent high-profile uses of AI in military operations. In January, Anthropic's Claude tool was used in the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and reportedly employed on the first day of Operation Epic Fury in Iran, with speculation that AI targeting systems were involved in a missile strike on a school that killed 175 people. The Trump administration has also asked for revisions to the Pentagon's rules around autonomous weapons, raising concerns among congressional Democrats that existing safety protocols and human oversight requirements could be undermined. The NDAA still requires reconciliation between Senate and House versions before becoming law.
Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick sent Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei a letter outlining the restrictions, marking the first time Washington has blocked an AI model release on national security grounds.
The directive followed warnings from Amazon researchers who flagged a jailbreak bypassing Fable's safeguards to elicit dual-use cyber capabilities. A person close to the White House told Semafor that Amazon flagged the jailbreak to the government, and that Amazon CEO Andy Jassy had been in contact with the administration about it. Fable 5 scored 53.3% on Humanity's Last Exam benchmark, compared to Claude Opus 4.8's 45.7%, and possesses capabilities similar to Claude Mythos Preview—a model Anthropic deemed too dangerous for general release in April. Mythos is understood to currently be in use by the NSA for offensive cyber operations, according to Tom's Hardware.
The export control directive required restricting access for all foreign nationals, whether inside or outside the United States, including Anthropic's own foreign-born employees. Given the scope of the directive, Anthropic argued it had no choice but to disable the models for all users. The company received the order at 5:21pm ET on 12 June and had to "abruptly disable Fable 5 and Mythos 5 for all our customers to ensure compliance." Access to other Claude models, including Opus 4.8, remained unaffected.
Anthropic contested the action, arguing that the jailbreak technique "essentially consists of asking the model to read a specific codebase and fix any software flaws," and that a demonstration surfaced previously known, minor vulnerabilities also discoverable by other publicly available models, including OpenAI's GPT-5.5. The company maintained its safeguards are substantially more effective than those of any previously deployed model, and that perfect jailbreak robustness is currently impossible. Anthropic wrote: "We disagree that the finding of a narrow potential jailbreak should be cause for recalling a commercial model deployed to hundreds of millions of people." CNN reported that Anthropic argued the standard would halt all new frontier model deployments across the AI industry.
The dispute unfolded against a backdrop of prior tensions. Earlier this year, the Department of Defense declared Anthropic a supply chain risk—a designation historically applied to foreign adversaries—following the collapse of talks between the two sides. The label obligates defense contractors to certify they are not using Claude in military work. White House AI adviser David Sacks said the administration issued the export control "reluctantly" after Anthropic refused to fix the flaw or pull the model, that it wants the restriction lifted once the jailbreak is patched, and that "the ball is in Anthropic's court." The action signals Washington's willingness to invoke emergency export controls to intervene in frontier AI deployment when national security concerns emerge, setting a precedent that could reshape how American labs release models globally.
On 22 June 2026, Ingham's Group, Australia's largest poultry producer, implemented complete lockdown measures across all Western Australian operations after H5N1 avian influenza was confirmed in two wild birds on the Australian mainland. The detections — a brown skua found sick on 14 June near Esperance and a giant petrel from the same isolated coastal area — represent the first confirmed H5N1 cases on the Australian mainland, ending the country's status as the only continent free of the globally circulating strain.
The Australian government announced the first confirmed case on 20 June 2026, after testing by CSIRO's Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness identified the clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 lineage. According to Agriculture Minister Julie Collins, authorities are working to determine whether the virus has established in wildlife beyond the two isolated birds, with no evidence of mass mortality in other species to date. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese described the detection as "concerning" and pledged the government would do whatever necessary to restrict any spread.
Ingham's lockdown, affecting farms and processing operations located 690 to 770 kilometres north of the Esperance detection site, prevents all non-essential access despite no detections in commercial poultry. The company's shares dropped as much as 14% in early Monday trading following the announcement. The precautionary measures aim to prevent transmission to domestic flocks, which could trigger large-scale culling and supply chain disruption across Australia's poultry industry.
The arrival of H5N1 on the Australian mainland follows years of global spread of highly pathogenic strains that have, according to researchers writing in The Conversation, caused a global animal pandemic since 2021, killing millions of wild birds and causing significant population declines in some species. The virus has also spread into wild and domestic mammals, with seals particularly affected. Australia had previously detected H5N1 only on sub-Antarctic Heard Island in late 2025, where the virus caused catastrophic mortality among southern elephant seals. Experts note that because the affected seabirds are marine species that do not occur on land in large numbers outside breeding season, there remains a possibility the virus may not establish itself broadly in Australian wildlife — though the greatest risk lies in potential transmission to freshwater ducks, which could dramatically accelerate spread across the continent.
Generated at 2026-06-24 05:46 UTC