The result marks a significant test of whether AI safety concerns can mobilise Democratic primary voters in the face of overwhelming spending from both sides of the technology debate.
The race drew extraordinary financial firepower. Think Big, a super PAC affiliated with the pro-AI group Leading the Future, spent at least $8 million against Bores, making this the most expensive race the industry PAC has contested. AI safety advocates responded with even greater resources: Anthropic supported a competing super PAC, Jobs and Democracy PAC, that spent almost $7 million to defend him, while NBC News and other outlets reported total pro-safety spending exceeding $19 million. OpenAI's President Greg Brockman and his wife contributed $25 million, roughly one-third of the $75 million Leading the Future has raised, underscoring the industry's strategic commitment to shaping Congressional composition on AI policy.
Bores had championed robust AI regulation as a state legislator, including mandatory reporting and independent safety testing for frontier models, a potential AI kill switch, and a direct payment program taxing AI usage to compensate displaced workers. The state Assembly member, a former Palantir engineer, successfully pushed the RAISE Act, one of the first state-level AI safety laws. However, he faced formidable structural disadvantages: Lasher had the backing of major state party leaders, including Gov. Kathy Hochul, former Mayor Michael Bloomberg — who remains popular in the Manhattan district where older voters play an outsize role in elections — and retiring Rep. Jerry Nadler, plus more than $10 million from Bloomberg.
In his victory speech, Lasher disavowed both AI PACs, stating he would not take cues from AI companies on protecting children, jobs, or the environment. Leading the Future's response was notably subdued, offering generic statements rather than claiming victory — a striking departure from the aggressive campaign it had waged. Bores framed the loss as progress for a broader movement, attacking the oligarchs funding Leading the Future and arguing that the race had elevated AI safety as a political issue. The contest was widely characterised as a proxy battle between OpenAI and Anthropic, reflecting deeper fractures within the AI industry over the pace and oversight of technological development.
On 24 June, Anthropic formally accused Alibaba of orchestrating what it described as the largest known distillation attack against its Claude AI model, detailing the allegation in a letter sent to the US Senate Committee on Banking and White House officials on 10 June. The San Francisco-based AI lab claimed that operators linked to Alibaba's Qwen AI laboratory deployed approximately 25,000 fraudulent accounts to conduct 28.8 million exchanges with Claude between 22 April and 5 June, systematically extracting capabilities in software engineering and agentic reasoning — the model's most commercially valuable features.
The attack relied on adversarial distillation, a technique in which a less capable model is trained on the outputs of a more powerful system to replicate its capabilities at a fraction of the development cost. Anthropic warned that this process allows competitors to bypass the enormous research and computational expenditure required to train frontier models from scratch, and that systems built through such methods often lack safety guardrails. The operation directly circumvented Anthropic's geographic restrictions, which explicitly prohibit Claude's deployment or access within China.
The accusation represents a significant escalation in a pattern Anthropic first disclosed in February, when it identified three other industrial-scale distillation campaigns by Chinese AI labs — DeepSeek, Moonshot AI, and MiniMax — involving roughly 24,000 accounts and 16 million exchanges. The Alibaba campaign substantially exceeded that combined volume. Anthropic stated in its letter that Alibaba ignored warnings from the Trump administration, which issued a memorandum in April pledging to help AI companies detect and coordinate against industrial-scale distillation.
The disclosure arrives amid heightened US-China tensions over AI development. Alibaba was added to the Pentagon's Chinese military companies blacklist on 8 June — a designation Anthropic cited in its letter — and the company has since sued the Department of Defense seeking removal. Meanwhile, Anthropic faces its own regulatory complications: earlier in June, the Trump administration imposed export controls on its latest Claude models, Fable 5 and Mythos 5, blocking access by foreign nationals including the company's own non-US employees. Alibaba has not responded to requests for comment on the allegations.
Senators Bill Hagerty and Andy Kim are moving to introduce an amendment to must-pass defence legislation that would blacklist or sanction any Chinese firm found improperly accessing US AI model outputs to train competing systems. The case underscores fundamental questions about how effectively frontier labs can enforce intellectual property boundaries around AI systems that can be copied through carefully crafted prompts, and whether the US can establish a practical enforcement regime for what amounts to a software-based capability border.
Kenya's Health Minister Aden Duale on 23 June ordered the immediate halt to construction of a US-backed Ebola quarantine facility at Laikipia Air Base, approximately 200 kilometres north of Nairobi, after being found in contempt of court for defying earlier judicial orders. The facility, which was to house up to 50 isolation beds for US citizens evacuated from the Democratic Republic of Congo's ongoing Ebola outbreak, had sparked deadly protests since its May announcement, with at least three people killed during demonstrations against the project.
High Court Judge Patricia Nyaundi ruled on Monday that Duale had commissioned construction despite multiple court orders issued in late May and early June to cease all building activities. Satellite imagery obtained by ABC News showed tents and infrastructure being erected at the site even after the court injunctions. Appearing before the High Court on Tuesday, Duale apologised and directed the cessation of all construction activities, with the court accepting his apology but warning that further disobedience would result in sentencing.
The facility was designed to quarantine Americans exposed to Ebola in Central Africa, after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that no Ebola cases would be permitted into the United States. The DRC outbreak has claimed at least 267 lives from 1,048 confirmed cases as of 22 June, with 75 healthcare workers infected and 17 dead. Uganda has reported 20 confirmed cases, including two deaths. The US had pledged $13.5 million toward Kenya's Ebola preparedness efforts as part of the partnership.
Public opposition intensified after the announcement that American patients would be quarantined abroad rather than repatriated. The case was brought by the Law Society of Kenya and the Katiba Institute, a constitutional watchdog, which argued the facility was developed without proper consultation and that Kenya's health system was ill-equipped to handle a potential outbreak. Kenya has recorded no Ebola cases during the current regional emergency, fuelling concerns about importing the virus. The decision to halt construction represents a significant setback for US pandemic preparedness infrastructure in East Africa, with implications for evacuating and isolating infected individuals from outbreak zones during active biological emergencies.
The ban, codified under 10 U.S.C. §4872, would prohibit defence contractors from using rare earth magnets if any stage of production—from mining through fabrication—occurred in China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea.
Permanent magnets are critical components across the defence industrial base. An F-35 carries 435 kilograms of rare earths, while next-generation destroyers require 4.5 tonnes and nuclear submarines 1.5 tonnes. The magnets are also essential for drones, guided munitions, precision navigation systems, and radar platforms—as well as civilian applications including wind turbines, which require approximately 12,000 kilograms per offshore unit, and electric vehicles. The deadline was already extended by one year in the FY2024 National Defense Authorization Act to give industry more time to qualify alternative suppliers, but major contractors including Lockheed Martin and Boeing are now mapping supply chains and warning that compliance may not be feasible without significantly more domestic capacity.
The supply constraint has been exacerbated by China's own export restrictions. In April 2025, Beijing imposed licensing requirements on seven rare earth elements and magnets, causing weeks-long delays for defence manufacturers. China later expanded controls in October 2025 to include a foreign direct product rule requiring export licenses for magnets containing even trace amounts—as little as 0.1 percent—of Chinese-origin materials. The licensing regime has been used to automatically deny exports intended for defence applications, creating immediate constraints on US and European rearmament efforts. China controls 94 percent of global permanent magnet manufacturing and roughly 90 percent of rare earth refining, giving Beijing substantial leverage over Western defence supply chains.
Despite the Pentagon investing hundreds of millions of dollars since 2020 under the Defense Production Act to rebuild domestic mining, refining, and magnet-making capacity, no fully scaled American mine-to-magnet chain exists. MP Materials' Texas plant aims to produce 10,000 tonnes of magnets annually by decade's end—barely half of projected US demand by 2030. The United States currently has one major rare earth mine at Mountain Pass, California, but most output still travels to China for processing. Industry analysts warn that converting rare earth oxide into defence-grade metal and alloys—a step that occurs almost entirely in China—requires three to seven years to replicate from initial investment to reliable production. A Govini analysis found more than 80,000 defence parts depend on minerals now subject to Chinese export controls, and smaller suppliers warn they maintain at best a few months of stockpiles. The CEO of Rheinmetall has stated his company maintains only one year of rare earth stock and requires weekly updates on supply levels, underscoring the fragility of European defence supply chains facing similar pressures.
The October 2025 Trump-Xi meeting in South Korea produced an official US readout revealing that Washington is actively seeking Chinese help to access rare earth refining technologies that China banned from export in 2008—long before Western lithography controls on China. The readout stated that "the Chinese side will address the concerns of the US side of not shipping out key rare earth production technologies," marking an extraordinary admission of technological dependence at the head-of-state level.
This public acknowledgment underscores the depth of Western vulnerability in critical minerals processing. As of April 2025, there was zero commercial-scale heavy rare earth refining capacity operating in the United States, representing 100% global dependency on China for these materials. Beijing commands the separation of heavy rare earths, none of which currently occurs in the United States, while China separates 99.9 percent of heavy rare earths globally. These elements are essential for advanced military systems including F-35 fighter jets, laser and radar systems, and precision-guided munitions.
China banned the export of rare earth extraction and separation technologies in December 2023, tightening controls that originated with export duties imposed in 2007-2008. The technology restrictions came as part of Beijing's broader strategy to maintain dominance not only over raw materials but over the specialized expertise required to process them. China possesses technical know-how in solvent extraction processing for rare earths that Western companies have struggled to replicate, both due to the complexity of advanced operations and environmental concerns associated with the refining process.
Industry signals about Western capabilities remain contradictory. Malaysia became the first country outside China to produce dysprosium oxide in 2025, a key heavy rare earth for defense applications, suggesting some progress in building alternative supply chains. Lynas has reportedly advanced its heavy rare earth refining operations in Malaysia, and Solvay's CEO claimed in a Dutch newspaper interview that the company can refine all 17 rare earths but won't invest without protection from Chinese market flooding. However, the Trump administration's explicit request for Chinese technology transfer at the May 2026 summit—following the initial October 2025 meeting—suggests official assessments remain pessimistic about the actual state of Western refining capabilities, particularly at commercial scale.
The technology gap carries profound implications for both economic and national security. The International Energy Agency estimated in April 2026 that if China's suspended rare earth export restrictions were fully implemented, countries outside China could face an annual economic impact of $6.5 trillion, with the automotive sector alone facing potential direct losses exceeding $3 trillion. The United States continues to rely on China for the majority of its rare earth supply, with China accounting for 61% of global mined supply and 91% of global refining capacity as of 2024.
On 15 December 2025, the United States government announced a $7.4 billion partnership with South Korea's Korea Zinc to build an advanced smelter and critical minerals processing facility in Clarksville, Tennessee. The project, backed by $210 million in CHIPS Act funding and structured through a joint venture in which the Department of Defense holds a 40% stake, represents the first primary zinc smelter built in the United States since the 1970s and aims to address complete import dependency on China for gallium and other strategic minerals essential to semiconductors, guided munitions, and AI systems.
The facility, expected to become operational in 2029, will produce 13 critical and strategic minerals including gallium, germanium, antimony, and rare earths, processing approximately 1.1 million tons of raw materials annually. Yet the investment highlights a persistent structural challenge in critical mineral reshoring: even substantial upstream capacity does not create end-to-end domestic supply chains. Gallium smelted in Tennessee must still be shipped to Europe, Japan, or China to be transformed into gallium arsenide wafers—a midstream processing step in which those regions hold specialized capacity—before returning to the United States and Taiwan for final chip fabrication. This fragmentation across allied and non-allied nations leaves multiple points of vulnerability, particularly as China targets midstream bottlenecks in response to Western technology export controls.
China's countermeasures have focused precisely on these weak links. In January and February 2026, Chinese exports of gallium to Japan—which had received 58% of China's gallium exports in 2025—dropped to zero, following new state-controlled licensing requirements for dual-use minerals announced in early January. While China briefly resumed limited gallium shipments to Japan in May 2026 after a four-month suspension, germanium exports remain halted. The restrictions compound pressure on Japanese gallium arsenide wafer production capacity, creating risk that this critical processing step migrates to China or disappears entirely, further deepening Western reliance on Chinese supply chains. Gallium prices surged more than 150% following China's initial export controls in 2023, with the Rotterdam price reaching $687 per kilogram in May 2025, underscoring the economic leverage Beijing wields through its dominance of approximately 99% of global gallium production.
Analysts argue the fragmentation problem cannot be solved unilaterally. Allied coordination is essential to distribute mining, refining, and processing capacity across trusted partners, yet national security considerations and industrial policy incentives make efficiency-based allocation politically difficult. Each country seeks to maximize domestic value capture and strategic autonomy, even when this results in duplicative or suboptimal investment. The Tennessee smelter exemplifies this tension: it addresses one chokepoint—raw gallium production—while leaving midstream wafer fabrication and final assembly distributed across jurisdictions with divergent interests. The Oregon Group notes that the project signals Washington's willingness to deploy capital and allied partnerships to rebuild industrial capacity, but warns that without coordinated allied investment in midstream processing, vulnerabilities will persist and China retains powerful leverage to disrupt high-tech supply chains critical to defense and artificial intelligence systems.
On 11 June, Senator Mark Warner, vice chair of the US Senate Intelligence Committee, disclosed that General Joshua Rudd—who simultaneously leads the National Security Agency and US Cyber Command—told him Anthropic's Mythos model had penetrated nearly all of the NSA's classified systems during an authorized red-team exercise. Warner quoted Rudd as saying the model "broke into almost all of our classified systems, not in weeks, but in hours." The claim, first reported by The Economist, surfaced in the context of Warner making the case for mandatory security testing of frontier AI models, and he framed the incident as evidence that responsible laboratories must be required to assess offensive capabilities before release.
The statement remains unconfirmed by any government agency, and Shashank Joshi, the Economist editor who published the original account, later clarified the claim "should not be read literally," noting it depended on Mythos working alongside other tools under specific conditions. Security and crypto executives have challenged the viral narrative, with BitGo CEO Mike Belshe calling it false and critics noting the absence of independent confirmation. The breach occurred during a controlled security evaluation on the agency's own networks, not an adversarial intrusion, and the full classified details have not been made public.
One day after Warner's disclosure, the US Commerce Department issued an export-control directive barring all foreign nationals—including Anthropic's own non-citizen employees—from accessing Fable 5 and Mythos 5. Unable to enforce nationality-based restrictions without blocking its own staff, Anthropic suspended both models globally. This marked the first time the United States had applied export controls directly to an AI model rather than to chips or hardware, a landmark regulatory precedent. Allied governments within the Five Eyes intelligence alliance were caught off guard, with permissions for agencies, banks, and major firms revoked without warning.
The intelligence agencies of all five Five Eyes nations issued a rare joint statement on 19 June warning that frontier AI models are "anticipated to exceed current industry expectations, fundamentally transforming both offensive and defensive cyber capabilities," adding that "the timeline is not years, it is months." Despite the government action, roughly six Anthropic engineers remain embedded inside the NSA as forward-deployed staff under Project Glasswing, adapting Mythos for operational use including potential infiltration of networks operated by China and Iran. The models remain offline for most users, though negotiations between Anthropic and the White House are ongoing.
ASML has categorically denied the allegation, stating that all 314 of its operational EUV systems worldwide are accounted for and none are located in China.
The dispute carries profound implications for the global AI supply chain. ASML is the only company on the planet that manufactures EUV lithography machines, which are used by firms such as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. to manufacture processors for the likes of Nvidia Corp. Senior Trump administration officials claim to hold evidence of EUV-related components and transport equipment being shipped to China, though that evidence has not been shared publicly or with ASML itself. According to Bloomberg, which first reported the confrontation on 19 June, the 180-ton EUV systems require constant ASML maintenance to operate.
Following Lutnick's allegations, ASML circulated a document in Washington titled "No indication of any ASML EUV System in China," counting 314 EUV machines in operation worldwide and 26 that have been decommissioned, none of them in China. The company has stated it tracks every machine through remote telemetry and that its China-based staff are walled off from EUV technology, documentation, and training. The confrontation has placed ASML in what Bloomberg characterised as internal "crisis mode", with the company required to prove the absence of equipment rather than confirm its presence.
The allegations emerge against a backdrop of intensifying US efforts to restrict China's access to advanced chipmaking tools. Export curbs introduced under the first Trump administration barred EUV exports to China, and the Netherlands has prohibited such exports since 2019. A bipartisan congressional bill advancing through committee would extend restrictions to cover all of ASML's deep ultraviolet lithography tools — older, less advanced systems that currently account for approximately 20 per cent of ASML's expected 2026 revenue from permitted sales to China. In December 2025, Reuters reported that Chinese researchers had developed a prototype EUV lithography machine, led by former ASML engineers. If China has successfully acquired or replicated functional EUV technology — whether through illicit transfer, component-level smuggling, or indigenous development — it would represent a fundamental breach of the compute governance architecture designed to constrain Chinese AI capabilities.
The system achieved state-of-the-art results in fixed-budget language model training, small-model training speed, and GPU kernel optimization, according to a company announcement.
The system automates the research loop for a target objective: it proposes an idea, implements it, runs an experiment, validates the result, and uses what it learns to choose the next experiment. It runs many research threads over long horizons, keeps useful context from prior experiments, combines promising branches, and puts results through validation for reward hacks and variance before treating improved performance as real progress. The company has open-sourced training scripts and kernel implementations discovered by the system, publishing them on GitHub.
The benchmarks were chosen for tight feedback loops and clear metrics. NanoChat Autoresearch, based on Andrej Karpathy's repository, tasks systems with training a small language model to the lowest validation loss within a fixed five-minute budget on a single GPU. NanoGPT Speedrun is a harder test: the benchmark asks how quickly a small GPT-style model can be trained to a fixed validation loss of 3.28 on the FineWeb text dataset using a single HGX H100 8-GPU node, and has been optimized by the community for over two years with 83 human record-setting contributions to the leaderboard. Recursive's best run reached the target in 77.3 seconds on 8× H100. SOL-ExecBench tests GPU kernel optimization toward hardware performance limits.
The demonstration arrives weeks after Recursive emerged from stealth in May with $650 million in funding at a $4.65 billion valuation, led by GV and Greycroft, with additional backing from AMD Ventures and NVIDIA. The company was founded in 2025 by researchers from OpenAI, Google DeepMind, Meta AI, Salesforce AI, and Uber AI, including Richard Socher, Tim Rocktäschel, Jeff Clune, Josh Tobin, and Tim Shi. The startup's central thesis is that the next leap in AI will come not from simply building larger models, but from automating the research process itself.
Recursive describes these as early signs that its system can advance the frontier on AI training and infrastructure tasks when the goal is well-defined, measurable, and efficient to evaluate repeatedly. The key uncertainty is whether such results can generalise to domains where goals are less well-defined, harder to measure, and less efficient to evaluate — the characteristics of fundamental AI research breakthroughs. The broader question is whether systems that excel at optimizing narrow, highly instrumented tasks can scale to the open-ended scientific discovery that recursive self-improvement ultimately requires.
The approval represents a dramatic escalation for an operator that has historically underinvested in high-voltage infrastructure, with 345-kV currently the highest operating voltage deployed in the ERCOT system. In December 2025, ERCOT's board approved a $9.4 billion 765 kV Eastern Backbone project, the most expensive single project in the grid operator's history and the first major phase of the broader STEP buildout.
The expansion comes as ERCOT's load forecast for transmission planning grew to more than 150 GW for 2030, driven by surging data center demand and massive renewable investments. According to Enverus Intelligence Research, the $33 billion transmission backbone marks a strategic shift toward system-wide modernization, with the plan expected to eliminate 1,400 miles of upgrades and save millions in congestion costs. ERCOT projects 95.5 GW of solar and 101 GW of battery storage additions by 2030, requiring substantial new transmission capacity to reduce curtailment and unlock stranded renewable resources.
Parallel to the 765 kV buildout, ERCOT is pursuing limited external connections while attempting to preserve its jurisdictional independence. The proposed Southern Spirit Transmission project is an approximately 320-mile ±525 KV, ~3,000 MW high voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission line connecting ERCOT and Southeastern transmission grids. The privately funded project represents a more than $2.6 billion investment by Pattern Energy and would more than double ERCOT's existing external transfer capability. The project received up to $360 million in Department of Energy support and is targeting a 2029 in-service date, though it faces continued legislative and regulatory opposition in Louisiana, where utility company Entergy has raised doubts about the proposal and a bill revised at Entergy's behest could derail the project.
ERCOT has famously remained an island with minimal connections to other grids, deliberately avoiding engaging in interstate commerce to stay outside the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's jurisdiction. The combination of the 765 kV backbone and projects like Southern Spirit represents a meaningful shift in strategy for an operator that has historically prioritized independence over interconnection. As ERCOT's 2024 Regional Transmission Plan notes, global electricity demand is growing exponentially, driven by economic growth, industrial expansion, electrification of transportation, and the rise of data centers and cloud computing—factors that are now forcing even ERCOT to reconsider the limits of grid isolation.
Generated at 2026-06-25 05:42 UTC